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Abstract
Permissioned blockchain, in which only known nodes are allowed to participate, has been widely
used by governments, companies, institutes and so on. We study the case where permissioned
blockchain is applied to the field of horizontal strategic alliances to ensure that any participant of the
alliance who does not follow the regulation will be detected and punished for his behavior afterward.
We propose a general hierarchical model of permissioned blockchain which includes three tiers:
providers, collectors, and governors. To utilize the overlap of collectors in gathering transactions
from providers, we introduce the reputation as a measure of the reliability of the collectors. With the
help of reputation system, governors will not need to check all transactions uploaded by collectors.
As a result, our protocol will have a significant improvement in efficiency. Meanwhile, let us denote
T to be the number of total transactions. Then the number of mistakes that governors suffer is only
asymptotically O(
√
T ) when guided by our reputation mechanism, as long as there exists a collector
who behaves well. This result implies that our protocol remains high performance. The reputation
mechanism also provides incentives for collectors to work honestly. To our knowledge, our work
is the first one to give an analytical result on reputation mechanism in permissioned blockchains.
Furthermore, we demonstrate two typical cases where our model can be well applied to.
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2 An Efficient Permissioned Blockchain with Provable Reputation Mechanism
1 Introduction
In recent years, the popularity of blockchain technology increases massively. Combined
with traditional techniques, numerous blockchain projects have been implemented in both
permissionless and permissioned environments. The most significant difference between
permissionless and permissioned blockchains is whether the identity of a participant is ac-
knowledged. Most widely known blockchain schemes, including Bitcoin [30], Ethereum [6],
and Litecoin [24], are permissionless architectures. They work in an open ecosystem, where
anyone is allowed to join as a validator without authorization. On the other hand, per-
missioned blockchains are relatively closed and only allow known nodes to access. These
structures are practical for governments, companies, and institutes that are regulated.
An application scenario of the permissioned blockchain is the horizontal strategic alliance
where multiple companies ally for mutual benefits. Some companies in the same area may
ally to reduce competition costs and improve customer service. However, companies in a
horizontal strategic alliance may not be fully trustful to each other since each company has
its private benefits. Using of permissioned blockchain reduces the need for such reliance thus
would fit in such circumstances.
In this paper, we propose a permissioned blockchain model in a hierarchical structure.
There are three kinds of nodes: providers, collectors and governors respectively. Providers
offer transactions to collectors. After labeling the transactions they received, collectors
forward them to governors. Governors are responsible for validating transactions, proposing
blocks, and maintaining the ledger. However, due to the efficiency issue, a governor may not
check all transactions they receive. Meanwhile, in each round, a leading governor, who is
selected via a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) scheme, is in charge of packing transactions in a block
and append the block to the end of the ledger.
As with many real-world cases, collectors overlap in gathering transactions from providers.
In this sense, it is convenient to apply a reputation mechanism on the collectors. In our
model, each governor maintains a local reputation vector for each collector that reflects
the collector’s reliability. Briefly, the vector is composed of three parts. The first part
records a collector’s performance on unchecked transactions. Specifically, a governor picks
one source for each transaction via this part. The second part shows a collector’s behavior
in dealing with checked transactions. The last part reflects whether a collector tends to
forge transactions. As the real status of a checked transaction is revealed immediately and a
fabricated transaction can be easily discovered with high probability, the last two components
of a collector’s reputation are updated in time. For the first part, the reputation is altered
when the legality of an unchecked transaction is uncovered, e.g., when a provider argues on
the validity of an unchecked transaction.
We use a parameter f to tune the proportion of unchecked transactions. The larger f is,
the less probability a transaction is checked, thus the faster the execution of the protocol
would be. In the meantime, when f is O(1), we prove that with our reputation mechanism,
the governor’s expected amount of mistakes on unchecked transactions is asymptotically the
square root of the number of total transactions with overwhelming probability when there
exists a well-behaved collector. This result shows that the protocol remains high performance
concerning high efficiency. To our knowledge, our work is the first one that gives an analytical
result on reputation mechanism in permissioned blockchains. Our reputation mechanism
also provides incentives for collectors to work as instructed by relating a collector’s profit
with his reputation. In total, our reputation mechanism combines performance, efficiency,
and incentives altogether.
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We also demonstrate the feasibility of our model by applying it to the case of car-sharing
and insurance. In a word, we believe our model solves many issues in the field of designing
reputation mechanisms in permissioned blockchains.
The rest of the paper is arranged as the following: Section 2 introduces the background
of our model and some related works. In Section 3, we build our model and describe the
main protocol. We give a full analysis of our model in Section 4 and apply our model to
real-world cases in Section 5. We conclude our work in Section 6.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Horizontal Strategic Alliances
The strategic alliance is an agreement between two or more companies to pursue mutual
benefits [12]. A vertical strategic alliance [37], like the supply chain, forms as a supplier-
producer cooperative relation to enlarging the company’s network to be able to offer a lower
price. Some companies in the same areas also establish a strategic alliance for some specific
purposes to reduce costs and improve customer service. The strategic alliance above is called
a horizontal strategic alliance [38]. A horizontal alliance is usually managed by a team
with members from each company and bounded by an agreement giving an equal risk and
opportunity.
In a horizontal strategic alliance, companies unite for a common interest. Although they
are all trustful that they won’t tolerate actions that may harm the alliance, someone may
conceal information for some reason. The alliance members share customers, while they still
need an intermediary as a customer acquisition channel. However, intermediaries are not
reliable enough that they may deceive companies about customers and transactions. For
such a three-tier structure of customers, intermediaries, and companies, customers serve
as data providers who generate and provide transactions, intermediaries are a response to
collecting, verifying, and submitting transactions. Meanwhile, companies perform reliant
governors in this hierarchy.
2.2 Consensus in Permissioned Blockchains
Compared with permissionless blockchains focusing on public environments where every
node may arbitrarily enter or leave the network, permissioned blockchains are operated by
known entities. These systems maintain the identity and status of participants. For example,
in consortium blockchains, members of a consortium or in business manage a permissioned
blockchain network. Meanwhile, in private blockchains, only one trusted entity is in charge of
the chain [8].
Various permissioned blockchain schemes have appeared and already been implemented
in practice. Up to v0.6 of Hyperledger Fabric [16], a native PBFT [9] is implemented.
In the newest version, an execute-order-validate architecture, rather than the traditional
order-execute one, was introduced to carry out the modularity of the protocol. Such a
design reduces the need for hard-coding the consensus protocol into the platform and enables
Fabric to fit into different circumstances [1]. For example, besides the traditional PBFT,
BFT-SMaRt [4] is also realized as a consensus module. The latter is now considered as
one of the most advanced implementations of BFT available. The core consensus scheme
lying in Tendermint Core [11] is a variation of PBFT which also resists f < n/3 Byzantine
nodes. However, Tendermint’s most momentous difference from PBFT is the continuous
rotation of the leader. Namely, the leader is changed after every block. R3 Corda [10]
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realizes a Hashed Directed Acyclic Graph (Hash-DAG) instead of a chain. A transaction is
only stored by those nodes who are affected by the transaction, that is, a node only stores
a part of the Hash-DAG. When implemented with Raft [32], R3 Corda tolerates half of
the nodes’ crashing. The protocol is secure with f < n/3 nodes acting arbitrarily when
implemented with BFT-SMaRt, as stated before. Quorum [34] supports a consensus scheme
known as QuorumChain which specifies never-crash-nor-subvert block-maker nodes who
are permitted to propose blocks. The scheme guarantees safety and liveness with f < n/3
arbitrary-fault nodes and one block-maker. (The chain may fork with multiple block-makers.)
Other platforms include Ripple [35], Multichain [29], etc..
Besides, beyond traditional BFT algorithms, several fresh consensus models were proposed
in recent years, which are considered more suitable for permissioned blockchains. Proof-of-
Authority (PoA) [2], as a new family of BFT algorithms, requires fewer message exchanges
hence provides better performance. Meanwhile, a new message-based consensus scheme
named as Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) [33] was presented just a few months ago, which is
a lightweight and sustainable permissioned blockchain.
2.3 Reputation Mechanisms
Reputation in the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks has been studied for decades. As the name
suggests, reputation works as a measure of the peer’s reliability and is evaluated according
to his historical behaviors. Various topics related to reputation research, such as the systems
design [19] [41], security issue [5] [21] and privacy protection [23] [39] have been deeply
studied in the literature. In recent years, the emergence and development of blockchain
technology bring some new thoughts to the research of reputation. The existing works mainly
focus on the following two aspects.
First, because of blockchain’s immutability and decentralization, some researches utilize it
as a wonderful tool to establish the reputation system [14] [15] [36]. For example, [17] uses the
permissioned blockchain to store the transactional history, which is regarded as the reputation
evidence. Then all registered participants’ reputation can be evaluated distributedly. Instead
of adopting traditional consensus protocols like Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake
(PoS) in the process of block generation, the proposed system in [17] presents a new protocol
called Proof-of-Reputation (PoR). The protocol assigns one of the nodes involved in the
current block, who has the highest reputation value, to be the leader of the current round.
Participants all believe that the node with a higher reputation value could provide better
services. As a result of taking full advantage of the reputation, the PoR protocol performs
efficiently in the designed system.
Second, some studies have applied the concept of reputation as an incentive to the
blockchain applications. Our work falls into this research area. [31] proposes a reputation-
based framework for blockchain systems which use PoW as their consensus protocol, to
avoid dishonest mining strategies. In the framework, each node has a public reputation
value, representing how well he has so far performed in the system. When the pool manager
sends invitations to miners to form his mining pool for the proof-of-work computation, one’s
probability to be invited is related to his reputation value. Nodes who are more reputable
have a higher chance to be invited into the mining pools and consequently gain more revenue.
Since this public reputation system is sustained over time, miners are incentivized to behave
honestly to maximize their long-term utility. However, this paper only lists several possible
influence factors and analyzes the update of reputation values qualitatively. The concrete
forms of update function and probability function are absent. [40] presents a protocol called
CycLedger for the sharding-based blockchain, which introduces the concept of reputation to
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provide nodes with enough incentive to enter the system. Nodes in the system are required
to give opinions on the validity of requested transactions. One’s reputation is computed
according to the cosine similarity between his opinions and the consensus results. In this
way, the node’s reputation is a good reflection of the honest computational resources he
has contributed to the system. By assigning nodes with more computational resources to
high-workload positions, the efficiency is further enhanced. Also, as a higher reputation
brings more revenue, the protocol attracts nodes to participate actively and honestly in the
system.
3 Architecture
3.1 Model Overview
Since our protocol implements a permissioned blockchain, the identities of nodes in the
network need to be maintained. Specifically, in our protocol, an Identity Manager (IM) is
responsible for recording the members of the chain as well as their roles. Meanwhile, it is in
charge of providing nodes credentials that are used for authenticating and authorizing. As a
default, an IM should contain all standard Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) methods and
play the role of a Certificate Authority (CA). Concretely, all interactions within the network
are authenticated via digital signatures and IM offers each node such a scheme.
In general, the hierarchical model is based on three types of agents:
Providers would provide transactions for collectors. They do not need to supply valid
transactions, however, they sign on transactions together with the timestamp so that no
collector could forge a transaction.
Collectors are responsible for collecting, verifying, and uploading transactions. Specifically,
after receiving a signed transaction from a provider, a collector would check it and label
it. For each transaction, a collector can label either +1 or −1, for which +1 implies
that the transaction is considered to be valid and −1 otherwise. After a while, collectors
would submit the transactions with their corresponding labels and their signatures to
governors (both valid and invalid ones).
Governors maintain the state of the network and are responsible for the chain. For each of
them, the main goal is to perceive as many authenticated transactions as possible. However,
governors are not fully trustful to each other. For example, some transactions may harm
a governor, thus he is incentivized to conceal these transactions to his collaborators.
If a governor is elected as the leader of a round, he will be in charge of collecting all
transactions and proposing them in the corresponding block.
Execution of the protocol is partitioned into rounds. There are three phases in each
round:
Collecting. A transaction offered by a single provider is sent to several collectors.
Uploading. Collectors label the received transactions and pack them. These labeled
transactions are then uploaded to the governors.
Processing. Finally, the governors judge part of the transactions and record those valid
ones as well as the unchecked ones in a new block, and append it to the ledger.
As we are dealing with permissioned circumstances, we assume that the system is
synchronous. (i.e. There is a known upper bound on processing delays, message transmission
delays, each node is equipped with a local physical clock and there is an upper bound on
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Figure 1 Hierarchical model of the network
the rate at which any local clock deviates from a global real-time clock [7].) We note that a
provider is linked with multiple collectors. Since different collectors may provide different
results of the same transaction and some of them may behave maliciously, e.g. reporting
different results to different governors or concealing some transactions, governors need to
reach a consensus on the recorded transactions in the processing phase. To reduce the
cost of evaluating invalid transactions repeatedly, reputation is applied to each collector.
Intuitively, a collector’s reputation is a symbol of his reliability. Reputation is also deemed
as an incentive mechanism in our protocol.
As a default, a governor has connection with all collectors, however, in real cases, a
governor may only perceive partial information. Under such conditions, the structure of the
network can be adjusted. For simplicity, we suppose each collector is linked with the same
amount of providers, similar for providers. However, we point out that the condition is only
for the need of a clear description, i.e., the model can be easily extended to general cases.
We give the following notations to formalize the hierarchy of the model. An illustration
of the model can be seen in Figure 1.
Denote the set of providers by P = {p1, · · · , pk, · · · , pl};
Denote the set of collectors by C = {c1, · · · , ci, · · · , cn};
Denote the set of governors by G = {g1, · · · , gj , · · · , gm};
Suppose each provider submits his transactions to r collectors and each collector receives
transactions from s providers. One can derive that rl = sn.
Suppose each governor gj maintains a list of reputation values for these n collectors
Rj = {~rj,1, · · · , ~rj,i, · · · , ~rj,n}. Note that a governor uses a vector to reflect his trust on a
collector. Details on the vector will be discussed later.
In each round, a block is appended to the end of a ledger. The block contains transactions
signed by the corresponding providers together with their corresponding labels. Note that
any block in the ledger is tamper-proof by containing the hash of the previous block in the
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current one. Moreover, each block has a serial number. The blocks in the chain have one-
by-one increasing serial numbers. Formally, a block B can be written as B = (s, TXList =
{tx1, · · · , txb}, h), where s is the serial number, TXList is the list of signed transactions
with labels and h is the hash value. Here, b is the amount for transactions concluded in the
block. There is a universal upper bound blimit on b.
For any provider, he can execute an operation broadcastprovider(tx) to broadcast tx to
the r collectors he is linked with. tx should contain a transaction payload, the current
timestamp, as well as the provider’s signature on them, to prevent a collector from fabricating
one. Meanwhile, when noticing that a valid transaction tx is regarded as invalid in block
B with serial number s, he can invoke argue(tx, s) so that governors will re-evaluate the
transaction. If tx is proved to be valid, then it will be contained in a later block. However,
the latency of arguing on a transaction should be no more than U transactions, or Ublimit
rounds.
For any collector, he can execute an operation broadcastcollector(Tx) to disseminate Tx
to all governors that are in connection with him. Tx should contain a transaction payload, a
timestamp, a recorded provider’s signature, a label (e.g. valid or invalid), and the collector’s
signature on all of them.
For any governor, he can execute an operation broadcastgovernor(m) to broadcast m to
all other governors.
To validate the authenticity of a message m, one can invoke verify(d,m) in which d is
the node he receives m from. The function will return a false when m is not sent by d (by
verifying the signature on m). Meanwhile, if d is a collector, the function also returns false
if m does not contain a signature by a provider with which d is linked. In other cases, the
function returns true. Moreover, a node can use validate(tx) to check whether tx is valid or
not.
For each node, he can call retrieve(s) to receive the block B with serial number s.
Resembling Hyperledger Fabric [1], our protocol is designed to satisfy the following properties:
Agreement: For any two blocks B and B′ retrieved with the same serial number s, B = B′;
Chain Integrity: For any two blocks B and B′, if B is retrieved with serial number s
while B′ is with serial number s + 1, then the hash value h′ contained in B′ satisfies
h′ = H(B), where H is a public collision-resistant hash function (CRHF).
No Skipping: Once a block with the serial number s is retrieved by a node, then blocks
with all previous serial numbers (i.e., 1, · · · , s− 1) are already retrieved before.
Almost No Creation: When an honest node perceives tx when retrieving a block B, then
excluding negligible probability of λ, tx has been broadcast both via broadcastprovider(·)
and broadcastcollector(·) previously. Here λ is the security parameter of the protocol.
Validity: If an honest and active provider broadcasts a valid transaction tx, then tx will
appear in a block eventually. Here we call a node active only when he retrieves every
block and invokes argue(·, ·) whenever he finds that some valid transaction he broadcasts
is labeled as invalid in a block.
We note that the first four properties are for the safety of the protocol and the last one is
for the liveness.
3.2 Collecting Phase
In this phase, data providers will offer transactions to collectors.
Specifically, each data provider pi ∈ P generates some transactions, signs on them together
with the timestamp t to achieve tx, and then broadcasts them to the r collectors he is in
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connection with by invoking broadcastprovider(tx). broadcastprovider(·) should implement an
atomic broadcast(i.e. total-order broadcast [7]) scheme to prevent the collectors from being
confused about the order of these transactions.
3.3 Uploading Phase
In this phase, collectors would process transactions from data providers. Once receiving a
transaction, collectors will check the authenticity of the transaction, validate the transaction,
and give it a label of +1 or −1 to show the transaction is valid or invalid. Then, for each
transaction with its label signed, Tx, the collector would operate broadcastcollector(Tx) to
disseminate Tx to all governors he connects to. As above, to reduce unnecessary inconvenience
for governors, broadcastcollector(·) should implement an atomic broadcast. Concretely, once a
collector ci receives a transaction tx from data provider pk, ci operates verify(pk, tx). If a
false is returned, then ci would simply discard tx. Otherwise, ci would check tx, output a
label, sign on them and broadcast it to governors. Algorithm 1 reflecting this step is shown
below.
Algorithm 1 Transactions Uploading
1: procedure Transactions_Uploading . For collector ci
2: upon 〈 deliverprovider | pk, tx 〉 do
3: if verify(pk, tx) == true then
4: l← validate(tx)
5: Tx← (tx, l, sigci(tx, l))
6: invoke broadcastcollector(Tx)
3.4 Processing Phase
In this phase, governors will judge part of the uploaded transactions, record valid and
unchecked transactions in a new block, and append the block to the ledger. Then the governors
will update the reputation of collectors. Specifically, for a governor gj , the reputation of
collector ci, ~rj,i, is a (s+2)-length vector ~rj,i = (wj,i,ki,1 , · · · , wj,i,ki,s , wj,i,misreport, wj,i,forge).
Here, pki,1 , · · · , pki,s are the s providers that ci is linked with. The first s entries record ci’s
performance on labeling transactions that are not validated by the governor. wj,i,misreport
reflects ci’s behavior on marking transactions that are checked by the governor, and wj,i,forge
indicates if ci tries to forge transactions. We introduce three parameters in this phase. f is a
parameter used for tuning the efficiency of the protocol, µ, ν are two parameters used when
distributing rewards among collectors.
3.4.1 Transaction Screening
In this step, a governor gj will collect all the transactions in this round and output a list of
transactions that have been verified to be valid or not verified.
For simplicity, in the description of this step, we only consider authenticated transactions.
In fact, those forged transactions can be discovered easily. Assume a transaction tx proposed
by pk is broadcast to a group of collectors {cik,1 , · · · , cik,r} and their reputations w.r.t pk
are wj,ik,1,k, · · · , wj,ik,r,k respectively before tx comes in.
Suppose gj receives x copies of tx, each with an attached valid bit from x different
collectors who belong to the set {cik,1 , · · · , cik,r}. Here x ≤ r, since some collectors might
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simply discard this transaction instead of uploading it in the uploading phase. Denote
Wj,k,tx,+1,Wj,k,tx,−1,Wj,k,tx,0 as the sum of reputation of collectors who labeled tx as valid,
invalid and missed uploading tx respectively.
gj chooses a collector cik,u randomly among those who reported tx with the probability
proportional to his current reputation with respect to pk. If the valid bit of the chosen
transaction is +1, gj verifies it. Otherwise, gj verifies it with probability 1− f Prj,ik,u,k,tx.
Here, Prj,ik,u,k,tx is the probability that the collector is chosen. Concretely, Prj,ik,u,k,tx =
wj,ik,u,k
Wj,k,tx,+1+Wj,k,tx,−1 where wj,ik,u,k is the collector’s reputation on pk. Recall that 0 < f < 1
is a parameter used for tuning the efficiency of the protocol. The larger f is, the faster the
protocol executes, yet the lower the correctness of the governor is.
For each transaction that is verified by gj , gj discards it if the validation result is invalid.
He outputs all the transactions that are proved to be valid, as well as those transactions that
have not yet been verified together with their valid bits with a label unchecked. Algorithm 2
shows the execution of the step.
The function parse(Tx) returns the original transaction and the collector’s label on it.
Moreover, due to the synchrony of the system as well as the property of the atomic broadcast,
we may assume that for any transaction tx, the interval that the governor receives the first
and the last report on tx is within ∆. The function starttime(tx,∆) starts a timing for tx
which will last for ∆ time and will invoke endtime(tx) when the timing comes to an end.
append(TXList, ·) is used to append the latter argument to the end of TXList.
3.4.2 Reputation Updating
For each transaction with an illegal signature, gj decreases the last entry of the uploader’s
reputation with 1. That is, assume this transaction is uploaded by ci, then gj decreases
wj,i,forge by 1.
For each transaction that has been validated by the governor, gj increases the (s+ 1)-th
entry of reputation of each collector that labeled this transaction correctly. For example,
if transaction tx is verified by gj to be invalid, then wj,i,misreport of each collector ci that
labeled tx with −1 will be increased by 1. In the meantime, those who reported the opposite
label will receive a loss of 1 in the respective entry of their reputations.
For each transaction tx that has not been verified, gj will not update reputations relative
to it until other evidence proves its validity. (e.g., a provider argues on an unchecked
transaction.) Then, each collector’s reputation relative to it will be multiplied by 1, γtx or β,
if he labeled tx correctly, incorrectly or simply discarded tx respectively. Specifically, assume
tx was collected from provider pk, then for each collector cik,u , if he labeled tx correctly, gj
would not change wj,ik,u,k; if he labeled tx incorrectly, gj would multiply wj,ik,u,k by γtx; if
he discarded tx, gj would multiply wj,ik,u,k by β.
The choice of β and γtx should satisfies the following inequalities:
β2 ≤ γtx ≤ β ≤ 12(γtx − 1)Ltx + 1 ≤ 1
where
Ltx =
2Wj,k,tx,wrong
Wj,k,tx,right +Wj,k,tx,wrong
Here, Wj,k,tx,right represents the sum of reputations whose owners labeled rightly, and
Wj,k,tx,wrong represents the sum of reputations whose owners labeled wrongly. Specifically,
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Algorithm 2 Transactions Screening
1: procedure Transactions_Screening . For governor gj
2: upon 〈 delivercollector | ci, Tx 〉 do
3: if verify(ci, Tx) == true then
4: (tx, label)← parse(Tx)
5: if received[tx] == ∅ then
6: starttime(tx,∆) . start timing
7: received[tx]← received[tx] ∪ (ci, label)
8: else
9: invoke Reputation_Updating(1, ci, nil, forge). Update reputation with case
number 1
10:
11: upon endtime(tx) do . timing is ended
12: Wj,k,tx,+1 ←
∑
cik,u labeled +1 on tx
wj,ik,u,k
13: Wj,k,tx,−1 ←
∑
cik,u labeled +1 on tx
wj,ik,u,k
14: Wj,k,tx,0 ←
∑
cik,u /∈received[tx] wj,ik,u,k
15: for all collectors cik,u ∈ received[tx] do
16: Prj,ik,u,k,tx ←
wj,ik,u,k
Wj,k,tx,+1+Wj,k,tx,−1
17: ~Prj,k,tx[u]← Prj,ik,u,k,tx
18: draw a collector cik,u who reported tx with probability vector ~Prj,k,tx
19: if cik,u labeled +1 on tx then
20: if validate(tx) == valid then
21: append(TXList, tx) . B is the current block
22: invoke Reputation_Updating(2, nil, tx, valid) . update reputation with
case number 2
23: else . cik,u labeled −1 on tx
24: toss a 1− f Prj,ik,u,k,tx 0-1 coin
25: if the coin returns 1 then
26: if validate(tx) == valid then
27: append(TXList, (tx, valid)) . B is the current block
28: invoke Reputation_Updating(2, nil, tx, valid)
29: else
30: invoke Reputation_Updating(2, nil, tx, invalid)
31: else . the coin returns 0
32: append(TXList, (tx, invalid, unchecked))
33:
34: upon 〈 deliverargue | pk, tx, s 〉 do
35: status← invalid
36: if validate(tx) == valid then
37: status← valid
38: append(TXList, (tx, valid))
39: invoke Reputation_Updating(3, nil, tx, status) . update reputation with case
number 3
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when tx is proved to be valid,Wj,k,tx,right = Wj,k,tx,+1,Wj,k,tx,wrong = Wj,k,tx,−1, vice versa.
Intuitively, when we assume that a mislabeling will cause a loss of 2 to the governor, Ltx
represents the expected loss of the governor when tx is unchecked according to Algorithm 2.
Readers may notice that γtx is not a fixed value. Despite of that, we claim that for each
β ∈ (0, 1) and Ltx < 2, such a γtx exists. In practice, β can be chosen as 0.9 and γtx can be
chosen as
max{β − 1
Ltx
+ β + 12 ,
β2 + β
2 } ∈ (0, 1).
Algorithm 3 shows a pseudo-code of the description above. Here, rank(cl) returns the
rank of cl in the set of collectors while label(cl, tx) returns collector cl’s label on transaction
tx.
Algorithm 3 Reputation Updating
1: procedure Transactions_Uploading(cn, cl, tx, status) . For governor gj and
provider pk
2: if cn == 1 then . case number = 1
3: wj,rank(cl),forge ← wj,rank(cl),forge − 1
4: else if cn == 2 then . case number = 2
5: for 1 ≤ u ≤ r do
6: if cik,u ∈ received[tx] then
7: if label(cik,u , tx) == status then
8: wj,u,misreport ← wj,u,misreport + 1
9: else
10: wj,u,misreport ← wj,u,misreport − 1
11: else . case number = 3
12: if status = valid then
13: Wj,k,tx,right ←Wj,k,tx,+1
14: Wj,k,tx,wrong ←Wj,k,tx,−1
15: else
16: Wj,k,tx,right ←Wj,k,tx,−1
17: Wj,k,tx,wrong ←Wj,k,tx,+1
18: Ltx ← 2Wj,k,tx,wrongWj,k,tx,right+Wj,k,tx,wrong
19: γtx ← max{β−1Ltx +
β+1
2 ,
β2+β
2 }
20: for 1 ≤ u ≤ r do
21: if cik,u ∈ received(tx) then
22: if label(cik,u , tx)! = status then
23: wj,ik,u,k ← γtxwj,ik,u,k
24: else
25: wj,ik,u,k ← βwj,ik,u,k
3.4.3 Consensus Reaching
A leader is elected in the set of governors each round. The leader selection with governors is
under the setting of Proof-of-Stake (PoS), in which the probability that a governor is selected
as the leader is proportional to his stake.
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Specifically, suppose a governor gj is with yj units of stake. In practice, the stake can be
money or any reliable form of asset. In round r, gj calculates and broadcasts a hash value
with the proof on his own via a Verifiable Random Function (VRF) [27] scheme for each unit
of stake. Concretely, for the u-th stake unit of gj , gj computes
〈hashj,u, pij,u〉 ←− V RFgj (r, j, u), 1 ≤ u ≤ yj
and disseminates them to all other governors by invoking broadcastgovernor(·). Again,
broadcastgovernor(·) implements an atomic broadcast primitive.
When a governor receives all the hash value from other governors, he first validates the
proof to check whether the hash value is correct. If the verification is passed, the owner of
the stake unit with the least hash value becomes the leading governor of this round.
We mentioned that such a design is much unsecured in permissionless settings as the
leader of a round is predictable. Self-election mechanisms in permissionless blockchains
are much more complicated [18] [22] [13] [3]. However, in a permissioned environment, we
may assume that these governors will not perform malicious behaviors rather than hiding
transactions. In other words, there is no motivation for them to damage the chain. In this
sense, as the VRF scheme ensures pseudorandomness of the hash value, our leader-electing
mechanism guarantees pseudorandomness as well, i.e., the probability that a governor is
elected as the leader is proportional to the amount of stake he owns.
After the leading governor of round r, gr,leader, finishes creating the transaction list
TXList, he will lay the new serial number s, TXList, and the hash of the previous block
h = H(Bprevious) in order to create a new block Bnew. The block will then broadcast to all
governors via broadcastgovernor(·).
When a block is proposed, all valid transactions contained in TXList will be executed.
A constant proportion of the profit gained by executing these transactions will be allotted
to the collectors according to their reputations. Concretely, collector ci’s revenue would be
in proportion with
∏r
u=1 w{r,leader},i,ki,uµ
w{r,leader},i,misreportνw{r,leader},i,forge , where µ and ν
are two parameters such that µ, ν > 1.
Besides, when stakes are transformed among governors, governors related to the transac-
tion should broadcast the signed transaction to all governors. The current leader would then
present a stake-transform block at the end of the round via the following 3-step consensus
protocol:
1. Denote the state after the transforming asNEW_STATE, which can be obtained by com-
bining the previous stake state and the transactions the leader received this round. gr,leader
would then invoke broadcastgovernor(NEW_STATE, siggr,leader(NEW_STATE) to
broadcast NEW_STATE to all governors.
2. When a non-leading governor delivers the message m from the leader, he should verify
the message by checking the signature and check the consistency of NEW_STATE with
the transactions he received. If the message is authenticated and satisfies consistency, he
will then send his signature on m back to the leader. However, when the message cannot
pass the verification, the governor should broadcast the evidence to other governors to
expel the current leader. Readers can refer to [40] for details in expelling a leader.
3. Finally, when the leading governor collects signatures from all governors, he will pack the
NEW_STATE and the signatures in the block, and broadcast it to all governors.
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4 Analysis
In this section, we prove that our protocol satisfies the properties mentioned in 3.1. Meanwhile,
we analyze the efficiency of our protocol by discussing the complexity in block generation and
the reputation mechanism. Also, we make a discussion on the incentives that the reputation
mechanism provides.
4.1 An Analysis of Consensus Reaching
In the consensus reaching process, we use Verifiable random function (VRF) scheme within
governors to select a leader pseudorandomly. As governors are believed with no motivation
to damage the consistency of the chain, blocks are proposed safely. Thus, every governor
adopts the same block in each round, which derives the Agreement, ChainIntegrity and
NoSkipping properties of our protocol. Meanwhile, contributed by the uploading phase, every
transaction packed in the block must be labeled by at least one collector. At the same time,
the collector cannot forge transactions without a provider’s public key except with negligible
probability of the security parameter λ. As a result, the property of AlmostNoCreation can
be pledged. Finally, if a transaction sent by an active provider is valid indeed yet was labeled
invalid and unchecked in the block, governors will immediately verify this transaction upon
receiving an argue(·, ·) request, and this transaction will appear in a following block. Thus,
the property of V alidity is ensured in our model.
To reach consensus on an ordinary block which contains transactions offered by governors,
an O(blimitm) communication complexity emerges. Meanwhile, to generate a stake-transform
block, governors should broadcast a transaction message to each other, which causes a
communication complexity of O(m2). However, recall that in the permissioned blockchain
scheme, the number of governors is much less than the number of providers and collectors.
So, the complexity of consensus is not the main efficiency problem that may be suffered from
this scheme.
4.2 An Analysis of the Reputation Mechanism
As stated in the protocol, consider a governor gj and a collector ci, the reputation vector ~rj,i
can be unfolded as ~rj,i = (wj,i,pki,1 , · · · , wj,i,ki,s , wj,i,misreport, wj,i,forge). The first s entries
represent the reputation on unchecked transactions which reflects on the screening probability.
The (s+ 1)-th entry shows the collector’s correctness of labeling transactions, and the last
entry is for the reputation on the frequency of forging transactions.
To show the high efficiency of the first s components of a collector’s reputation, we give
the following theorem.
I Theorem 1. Consider a group of collectors who oversee the same provider pk. Suppose the
real states of T transactions provided by p are revealed sometime after they appeared in the
ledger and T is not too large. Let LT be the accumulated expected loss on these transactions
for the governor, and SminT be the accumulated loss for the best-behaving collector on these
transactions, with a suitably-chosen β, we have
LT ≤ SminT +O(
√
T )
Proof. The theorem is an extension of the result for the Randomized Weighted Majority
(RWM) Algorithm in the problem of learning with expert advice [28]. We use the potential
method to prove the theorem.
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Recall that, for the t-th transaction that remains unverified when packed into the block,
the expected loss for the governor on this transaction should be:
Lt =
2Wt,2
Wt,0 +Wt,2
as for the transaction, the governor simply marks it as invalid in the block. Here, Wt,0
denotes the sum of reputations of those collectors that made the correct judgment for the
t-th transaction, Wt,1 denotes the sum of reputations of collectors who failed to make a
judgment, and Wt,2 denotes the sum of reputations of collectors in the other case, as stated
before.
Let Wt be the sum of reputation of all collectors who processed this transaction. We
derive that
Wt+1 = Wt,0 + βWt,1 + γtWt,2
= Wt + (β − 1)Wt,1 + (γt − 1)Wt,2
= Wt + (β − 1)Wt,1 + γt − 12 Lt(Wt −Wt,1)
= (1 + γt − 12 Lt)Wt + (β − 1−
γt − 1
2 Lt)Wt,1
≤ (1 + γt − 12 Lt)Wt
The last inequality holds due to Wt,1 is positive and the choice of γt:
γt ≥ max{2(β − 1)
Lt
+ 1, β2} ≥ 2(β − 1)
Lt
+ 1
As W0 = r, we have
WT ≤ r
T∏
t=1
(1 + γt − 12 Lt)
To give a lower bound on WT , assume wminT be the reputation of the collector with
accumulated loss SminT for the T transactions, as
γt ≥ max{2(β − 1)
Lt
+ 1, β2} ≥ β2
holds for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , we derive that
WT ≥ wminT ≥ βS
min
T
Combining the lower bound and upper bound for WT , we establish that
βS
min
T ≤ r
T∏
t=1
(1 + γt − 12 Lt)
= r
T∏
t=1
(1− 1− γt2 Lt)
≤ r
T∏
t=1
(1− 1− β2 Lt)
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The last inequality holds as γt ≤ β for each t. By applying logarithm to both sides of the
inequality and due to log(1− x) ≤ −x for each x in [0, 1), we have
βS
min
T ≤ r
T∏
t=1
(1− 1− β2 Lt) =⇒ S
min
T log β ≤ log r +
T∑
t=1
log(1− 1− β2 Lt)
=⇒ SminT log β ≤ log r −
1− β
2 LT
=⇒ LT ≤ 21− β log r −
2
1− β log β S
min
T
We note that − log β1−β ≤ 172 − 8β for β ∈ [0.1, 0.9]. Thus, in this interval, we obtain that
LT ≤ 21− β log r + 2(
17
2 − 8β)S
min
T
≤ SminT +
2
1− β log r + 16(1− β)2T
≤ SminT + 2(
log r
1− β + 16(1− β)T )
When β = 1− 4√log r/T ≤ 0.9 holds, we derive that
LT ≤ SminT + 16
√
log rT
= SminT +O(
√
T )
When r = 8, the condition holds when T ≤ 4800, which is realistic. J
Notice that O(
√
T ) = o(T ), thus the result we achieved is meaningful.
In our protocol, an honest provider can argue with the governor when he found any of
his transactions marked invalid in the block. However, the latency should be no more than
U unchecked transactions, i.e., the real state of a transaction which is marked invalid and
unchecked can only be retrieved before it is "buried" by no more than U transactions with
the same state. Every unchecked transaction exceeding this limit will be regarded as invalid
permanently. Equivalently, the loss of the group of collectors on a specific transaction can be
obtained within U transactions’ latency.
Readers may be confused about the result proved above when considering latency, however,
we claim that only a latency on the updating of reputation is induced. To show this, consider
the first U unchecked invalid transactions. These transactions are sampled with a never-
updated reputation in the worst case. However, before the (U + 1)-th unchecked transaction
is picked up, the real status of the first one has already arrived, which will cause a renewal
on the collectors’ reputation. In this sense, when the (U + V )-th unchecked transaction is
stored into a block, the reputation has already been updated by V times.
Notice that a governor only takes losses in those unchecked transactions as once a
transaction is validated, the authentic status will be perceived, thus will cause no damage to
the governor. To derive an overall result on a collector’s loss, we calculate the probability
that a transaction is unchecked in the following lemma.
I Lemma 2. For any transaction tx, the probability that tx is unchecked is no more than k.
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Proof. Recall that f is the parameter used to tune the probability of checking a transaction
when it is thought as invalid. To prove the lemma, we compute the probability that a
transaction tx provided by pk is validated.
Consider a governor gj . Suppose tx is broadcast by pk to collectors {cik,1 , · · · , cik,r}
whose reputations w.r.t pk are wj,ik,1,k, · · · , wj,ik,r,k respectively before tx comes in. Denote
Wj,k,tx,+1,Wj,k,tx,−1,Wj,k,tx,0 as the sum of reputation of collectors who labeled tx as valid,
invalid and missed uploading tx respectively. Then, for the probability that tx is checked,
Ptx,checked, we have:
Ptx,checked =
1
Wj,k,tx,+1 +Wj,k,tx,−1
(
∑
ia labeled +1
wj,ia,k +
∑
ia labeled −1
wj,ia,k(1− f
wj,ia,k
Wj,k,tx,+1 +Wj,k,tx,−1
))
= 1− 1(Wj,k,tx,+1 +Wj,k,tx,−1)2
∑
ia labeled −1
fw2j,ia,k
≤ 1− 1(Wj,k,tx,+1 +Wj,k,tx,−1)2 fW
2
j,k,tx,−1
≤ 1− f
Thus, for any transaction tx, the probability that tx is unchecked is no more than f . J
By applying Hoeffding’s Inequality [20], we give the following theorem:
I Theorem 3. Suppose N transactions enter the network in total, then for any δ > 0, the
following inequality holds:
Pr[more than (f + δ)N transactions are unchecked] ≤ e−2δ2N
Proof. A direct application of Hoeffding’s inequality can achieve the given theorem. J
Combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, we achieve our core theorem:
I Theorem 4. Suppose N transactions enter the network totally and N is not too large. For
all unchecked transactions provided by a fixed provider, suppose there is a collector whose
accumulated loss on these transactions is S, then for any δ > 0, with probability no less than
e−2δ
2N , the accumulated expected loss L for the governor on this provider satisfies:
L ≤ S +O(
√
(f + δ)N)
Proof. The theorem follows directly by combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 3. J
Thus, if for any provider, there is a collector who behaves well, then the performance of
the governor is guaranteed.
A considerable benefit of introducing reputation into our protocol is that we can provide
incentives for collectors to behave honestly via the reputation system. In general, as nodes
in a permissioned system have a sufficient amount of computation resources to complete the
given task, we hope a collector’s reputation be a good measurement of his reliability and
honesty.
Note that the safety of the protocol is already demonstrated in the previous subsection
via the first four properties. Typically, to damage the efficiency of our protocol, there are
three classes of misbehavior that a collector may commit: (1) to misreport the correct status
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(valid or invalid) of a transaction, (2) fail to report a transaction he receives from a provider,
and (3) to forge a transaction and report it to the governor.
To simplify the discussion, we consider a provider with all collectors he is linked with as
well as a governor who is in connection with all these collectors. In this sense, a collector’s
reputation is composed of three parts, reputation on unchecked transactions, reputation on
checked transactions, and reputation on forging transactions.
For a transaction, if a collector reports the opposite label or simply fail to report it, there
are two cases:
The transaction is checked by the governor. In this case, the misguiding collector will
immediately suffer a loss on the second component of his reputation. A misreporting will
lead to a higher cut on the reputation than concealing.
The transaction is unchecked by the governor. In this case, the real status of the
transaction is revealed within a time-bound. Collectors who missed to report or uploaded
opposite labels will receive a corresponding discount on the first component of the
reputation.
For those who try to forge a transaction, due to the security of the digital signature
scheme, there is only with negligible probability of λ to trump up a never-occurred transaction.
A malicious collector cannot simply replicate a transaction as well since the transaction is
signed together with the timestamp. In all, any fabricating behavior will be detected by the
governor except a negligible probability of λ. Once such behavior is noticed, a loss on the
third component of reputation will severely reduce the revenue of the criminal.
Note that a collector’s reputation directly reflects on his revenue. Specifically, when
gj is the leading governor of a round, collector ci’s profit will be in proportion to the
product
∏r
u=1 wj,i,pki,uµ
wj,i,misreportνwj,i,forge . Thus, the more unreliable ci is, the less
wj,i,pki,u (1 ≤ u ≤ r), wj,i,misreport, wj,i,forge will be, as µ, ν > 1, the smaller the product∏r
u=1 wj,i,pki,uµ
wj,i,misreportνwj,i,forge will be, and less profit ci will gain. In this sense, our
reputation mechanism provides high incentives for collectors to follow the instructions.
5 Applications and Use Cases
There are two distinct advantages of our model when it is put into practice. Our model
suits well in circumstances where governors may be trustful yet selfish as a public ledger is
maintained. In the meanwhile, the reputation mechanism helps us pick out those collectors
with high reliability. In this sense, the high efficiency of collecting transactions can be realized.
In this section, we will show that our model can be well applied in the field of car-sharing
and insurance.
5.1 Car-sharing
Car-sharing is one of the biggest markets in today‘s sharing economy. In traditional car-
sharing markets, users firstly submit ride requests to the scheduler, who decides whether
to accept this request or not and assigns which server (car) to pick them up. This online
scheduling problem has been solved in [25] [26]. However, the situation in the car-sharing
market has changed a lot recently. In the past, different car-sharing companies competing
with others, but now more of them start merging and allying with others. As a result, some
new issues arise. Using the collaboration of Uber and Didi as an example, although they
have the same stockholders now, they still have to maintain two platforms and need to serve
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segregated users after merging. Under these circumstances, how to integrate the resources
effectively is a big challenge. Besides, the incident of driver killing passenger caused an
extremely bad social impact in history, which shows the importance of security problems in
the car-sharing.
The blockchain model we presented in this paper can solve the above problems. In
our model, the user acts as the provider whose requests and payments are presented as
transactions. Different from sending to platforms traditionally, users deliver transactions
directly to some drivers in our model, who take the roles of the collector in this scheme.
When receiving a transaction from a user, the driver labels the transaction +1 if he is willing
to provide the services and labels −1 otherwise. After that, drivers deliver these labeled
transactions to schedulers, who play as governors in our system. The schedulers have to
decide immediately which driver should serve the user according to their states, locations,
and reputations. Finally, a leader is selected from schedulers and the block including both
assigned and unassigned requests is broadcast in the system, and every user and driver can
operate according to this block. For unassigned requests, the schedulers should send them to
drivers again later.
Comparing with traditional structure, our model has several advantages for the car-
sharing issue. First of all, in our model companies don’t need to build a new platform when
merging. Besides, the security and traceability provided from blockchains can prevent the
occurrence of driver murder, which is also really important for the nowadays car-sharing
market. Finally, the reputation system we present can discover some untruthful or dishonest
drivers, helping platforms make a better arrangement.
5.2 Insurance
In the insurance industry, insurance companies offer various insurance policies to the public.
A person, known as the potential policyholder, tends to buy proper insurance according to
his own needs. Besides, there is a third party called independent agent, who is responsible
for selling insurance policies provided by different insurance companies. In general, the
independent agent collects a policyholder’s requirements and personal information, and help
him buy certain insurance. Then the independent agent would receive rewards for the policy
that he sells.
Take health insurance, for example. More and more people buy critical illness insurance
for financial protection in case of an emergency. Specifically, the independent agents need to
investigate all listed factors in the policies and then submit a summary to the companies.
Those factors, such as age, gender, smoking status, past medical history, family history,
and alcohol consumption, are used to estimate the potential policyholder’s risk of having
serious illnesses. Here, we say "potential" because the policies have some limitations on the
policyholder. A person may be rejected because of his past medical history. Thus, a potential
policyholder may hide some records or provide false information. On the other hand, as the
independent agent’s revenue is closely related to the policies he sells, he would try his best to
avoid the possible rejection. When receiving a commission from a person, the independent
agent may submit an incorrect survey to the companies, to help the potential policyholder
get insured successfully. Of course, those misbehaviors could be detected by the companies.
Our proposed model can be applied to this scenario. The potential policyholder, who
would like to buy certain insurance, is the provider in our model. He needs to prepare
some materials according to the policy. We regard these materials as transactions. The
potential policyholder uses his secret key to sign each transaction and provides them to several
independent agents, who take the role of collectors. After receiving a set of transactions, the
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independent agent verifies each of them. He labels +1 for the valid transactions while -1 for
invalid ones. Then, he summarizes the transaction information, fills out a survey, makes a
digital signature and submits the labeled transactions and survey to the insurance companies.
In this context, all insurance companies act as governors. A leader will be selected to store
all received into the block. Sooner or later, they may check the materials and surveys with a
certain probability.
The immutability of blockchain ensures that all participants’ behaviors will be permanently
recorded, in the form of reputations in our model. If the potential policyholder provides
false evidence, he cannot deny the facts because of his signature. Likewise, if an independent
agent makes wrong judgments on the evidence, or fills out inconsistent information in the
survey, he would also be found out.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a permissioned blockchain model for the setting of horizontal strategic
alliances, where several companies ally for mutual benefits. The hierarchical model contains
three types of nodes, namely, providers, collectors, and governors. They are abstracted from
the real world and have their respective tasks: providers send transactions to collectors;
collectors label the validity of received transactions, and then forward them to governors;
governors pack the transactions into generated blocks. Owing to the overlap of transactions
that collectors receive from providers, we introduce the concept of reputation to reflect
the collectors’ reliability. Each governor maintains a local reputation list for all collectors
according to the transactions and labels they submit, and utilizes the reputation to decide
the verification probability for transactions with an invalid label. We prove that, as long as
there is a well-behaved collector, the expected amount of mistakes that governors suffer when
guided by our reputation mechanism is only asymptotically the square root of the number
of total transactions with overwhelming probability. Meanwhile, the collector’s revenue is
closely related to his reputation. In a word, with the help of the reputation mechanism, our
protocol has high efficiency, great performance, and good incentives. Furthermore, we apply
our model to two real settings, including the car-sharing market and insurance industry.
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